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New York Breaks Gideon’s Promise
By Rebecca King
I. Introduction
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
criminal defendants have the constitutional right to counsel,
regardless of whether they can afford one, in the famous case of
Gideon v. Wainwright.1 However, statistics, as well as public
defense attorneys, reveal that the Supreme Court’s decision has
yet to be fulfilled. Part of the problem is due to the system of
mass incarceration in the United States. In 2013, the Brennan
Center for Justice reported that the prison population reached
2.3 million individuals, compared to the 217,000 inmates
imprisoned when Gideon was decided.2 The American Bar
Association estimates that between 60 to 90 percent of criminal
defendants cannot afford a lawyer, and must rely on public
criminal defense services.3
Even though there has been an exceptional rate of
criminalization and growth in the prison system population,
funding for public defenders remains inadequate and meager
compared to prosecution offices. In 2007, the U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS), determined that state and local public
defender offices’ budgets were merely $2.3 billion, compared to
prosecutor offices’ budgets that were approximately $5.8 billion.4
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963).
2. THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 3 (2013) (citing E. ANN
CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011
and TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2011 (2012).
3. MAREA BEEMAN, USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC DEFENSE
PROGRAMS
2
(2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_sustaining_and_
improving_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf.
See
also
ROBERT
L.
SPANGENBERG ET AL., CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE 3 n.1 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.
4. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2 at 4 (citing STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN
BANKS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES, U.S. DEP’T
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BJS further concluded that only 27 percent of county-based
public defender offices have an adequate number of attorneys to
effectively manage their caseloads.5
This has real consequences for defendants. “Numerous
studies that stretch from the 1980s to recent years show that
public defenders meet with clients less quickly, file fewer
motions, plea-bargain more often, and get charges dismissed less
often than private attorneys.”6 However, since politicians
receive little incentive from voters to reform the public defense
system and increase public defender offices’ funding, these
deficits continue to persist in jurisdictions.7 The absence of a
political upside for lawmakers to increase funding may be the
reason why Governor Cuomo of New York vetoed Bill
S.8114/A.10706, a criminal justice reform bill that would have
required New York State, rather than the individual counties, to
provide funding for public defender office.8
II. Background
A. Before Gideon
a. English Common Law
Until 1836, English common law held that although
defendants in civil and misdemeanor criminal cases were
entitled to counsel, those accused of treason or a felony were
not.9 Proponents of the old rule argued that there was no need
JUST.
BUREAU
OF
JUST.
STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf; LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007- STATISTICAL
TABLES, Table 1 (Jun. 27, 2010), http://bjs.gov/content /pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf.
5. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 4.
6. Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices
are Suing—and Starting to Win, ABA J. (Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.
com/magazine/article/the_gideon_revolution.
7. Id.
8. Jimmy Vielkind, Citing Cost, Cuomo Vetoes Indigent Legal Defense
Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 31, 2016, 11:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/states/newyork/albany/story/2016/12/citing-cost-cuomo-vetoes-indigent-legal-defensebill-108386.
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
OF
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for counsel, because the judge would ensure fairness and justice
was served.10 The belief was that “the judge was impartial and
looked with equal suspicion on both sides in a criminal
action . . . .”11 However, many did not believe this was equitable,
and sought change.
Many legal scholars vehemently believed this common law
rule defied principles of justice. Opponents of the rule, including
Blackstone in 1758, argued that it was illogical to deny those
accused of a felony the assistance of counsel, but assure those
accused of petty crimes the right to retain counsel.12 The
colonies opposed the rule as well.13 At least twelve of the
thirteen colonies rejected the English common law rule and
maintained that the right to counsel was generally recognized in
all criminal cases.14
b.

Initial Supreme Court Interpretations

In 1932, the Supreme Court considered its first major
criminal defense representation case in Powell v. Alabama.15 In
Powell, a group of black men were charged with raping two white
women.16 At the arraignments, the judge “appointed all
members of the bar” for the defendants, apparently assuming
that the counsel who represented them during arraignment
would continue to do so during their trial.17 Each defendant was
arraigned and pled not guilty.18 However, on the morning of the
trial, the judge realized that none of the defendants had a lawyer
to represent them.19 The judge asked if anyone would volunteer
to represent the defendants, and a real estate attorney from
10. Id. at 61.
11. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 11
(1955).
12. Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
13. Powell, 287 U.S. at 58.
14. Id. at 64-65 (noting that there were a few instances where the right
to counsel was limited to capital punishment cases).
15.
Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections about Gideon v.
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 188 (2003).
16. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932).
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 49-50.
19. Id. at 57.
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Tennessee offered to do so.20 A local attorney who had not tried
a case in years offered to assist the Tennessee attorney.21
Neither of the attorneys had knowledge of the facts of the case,
or even their clients.22 Yet, the defense attorneys did not move
to postpone the trial.23 The court then granted the prosecution’s
request to severe the defendants into three different groups.24
Each of the three groups of defendants had a jury trial that
lasted one day.25 All of the defendants were found guilty of rape
and sentenced to death.26
The defendants appealed, arguing that their Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated, because “(1) They were not
given a fair, impartial, and deliberate trial; (2) they were denied
the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of
consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial; and (3)
they were tried before juries from which qualified members of
their own race were systematically excluded.”27 The Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed the convictions.28
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted a writ
of certiorari.29 The Court decided that when a defendant in a
capital case is not able to afford an attorney and is incapable of
making his own defense, “it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law[.]”30 The Court noted that the
right to counsel is essential for even intelligent laymen.31
Justice Sutherland noted that a defendant needs “the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
20. Powell v. Alabama, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N (2010), http:/
/www.nlada.net/library/article/na_powellvalabama [hereinafter NLADA].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932).
25. Id. at 50.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Powell v. Alabama, 286 U.S. 540, 540 (1932).
30. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
31. Id. at 69.
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innocence.”32 With this decision, the Court established a
criminal defendant’s right to counsel in a capital case.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court expanded the
holding in Powell.33 In Johnson, the petitioner and another
criminal defendant were “charged with feloniously uttering and
passing four counterfeit twenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes
and possessing twenty-one such notes” in Charleston, South
Carolina.34 The defendants did not have an attorney to
represent them and were unable obtain counsel.35 Throughout
the course of one day, January 23, 1935, the defendants were
notified of their indictment, arraigned, tried, convicted, and
sentenced.36 During the arraignment, the defendants pled not
guilty, and informed the Court that they did not have a lawyer,
but that they were ready for trial.37 The two defendants had
minimal education, lived in “distant cities of other states[,]” and
had no family, friends, or acquaintances in Charleston.38 During
the trial, the petitioner spoke with the District Attorney, not the
Judge, and requested for the Judge to appoint counsel.39 The
District Attorney explained to the petitioner that South Carolina
trial courts do not appoint counsel unless the trial is for a capital
crime.40
After the defendants were sentenced, the petitioner
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.41 The United States
District Court denied the petitioner habeas corpus, finding that
even though the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was violated during his criminal trial, the petitioner was still not
entitled to habeas corpus because the trial errors were
insufficient to void the trial.42

32. Id.
33. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
34. Id. at 459- 60.
35. Id. at 460.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 460-61.
40. Id. at 461.
41. Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 253 (N.D. Ga. 1935), aff’d sub
nom. Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
42. Id. at 256.

5

KING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/10/18 3:08 PM

NEW YORK BREAKS GIDEON’S PROMISE

665

The petitioner appealed the District Court’s denial of his
writ of habeas corpus, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decision.43 The petitioner then petitioned for a writ of certiorari
and the Supreme Court granted the petition.44 The Court held
that the Sixth Amendment not only provided defendants in
criminal cases with the right to counsel, but also required the
federal courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in
federal criminal court.45 Since the Court recognized the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the Court’s holding did not
apply to state courts.46
However, in Betts v. Brady the Court considered whether
state courts should be required to provide indigent defendants
with counsel in non-capital cases.47 The Court concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and the defendant’s constitutional
guarantee to counsel only applied in federal courts.48 In
reaching its holding, the Supreme Court noted that in the
majority of states, citizens and their legislators have decided to
forego requiring the courts to appoint counsel to defendants.49
The Court held, “the appointment to counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial[,]” but rather a matter
of “legislative policy” for the states.50 The Court felt that because
the states apply a wide range of policies regarding public
criminal defense, the states should make the ultimate decision.51
In the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Betts
v. Brady, and the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court heard numerous cases where a defendant was convicted
in a non-capital criminal state court without counsel.52 The
Supreme Court recognized “special circumstances” in which the

43.
(1938).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 458
Johnson v. Zerbst, 303 U.S. 629 (1938).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
Jacob, supra note 15, at 191-92.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 471-72.
Jacob, supra note 15 at 194.
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trial court was required to appoint counsel for a defendant.53
The Supreme Court held that even “the mere existence of a
serious criminal charge constituted in itself special
circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.”54 Trial
courts were required to consider the defendant’s “age, his
educational background, his mental history, his prior experience
in court, the complexity of the case, and the severity of the
charges . . . before reaching a decision about the defendant’s
request for a lawyer.”55 However, the Supreme Court still did
not hold that a criminal defendant in state court had a
constitutional right to counsel.56
III. Gideon
On June 3, 1961, the Bay Harbor Pool Room was broken into
around 5:30 a.m.57 The intruder entered the Pool Room after
breaking a window, and stole beer, wine, and coins from the
jukebox and cigarette machines.58 Later that morning, Clarence
Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking and entering
with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.59 Under Florida state
law, the crime was considered a felony.60
Clarence Gideon resided in a rooming house across the
street from the Pool Room, and had spent the most of his adult
life in prison or jail on various robbery and larceny convictions.61
Gideon could not afford a lawyer, was arraigned, and pled not
guilty without assistance of counsel.62 When he requested an
attorney from the Court, the trial judge stated that Florida law
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 194, n. 59 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351).
55. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years
After ‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-aftergideon/273433/.
56. Id.
57. Jacob, supra note 15, at 200.
58. Bruce R. Jacob, The Gideon Trials, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2059, 2060- 61
(2014).
59. Id.
60. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963).
61. Jacob, supra note 15, at 185; Jacob, supra note 60, at 2061-63.
62. Jacob, supra note 60, at 2061.
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did not require courts to assign a defendant an attorney, unless
the defendant was charged with a capital offense.63 Gideon,
however, argued that the “United States Supreme Court sa[id
he was] entitled to be represented by Counsel.”64 The Court did
not find Gideon’s argument to be convincing and refused to
appoint him an attorney.65 This forced Gideon to take matters
into his own hands.
Gideon represented himself at trial.66 The Supreme Court
characterized his performance as “about as well as could be
expected from a layman.”67 Gideon was convicted by a jury and
sentenced to five years of state imprisonment.68 Gideon filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme
Court, arguing his conviction violated his constitutional rights.69
The Florida Supreme Court denied Gideon’s petition for habeas
corpus.70 However, this did not deter Gideon. He sent a
handwritten letter to the Supreme Court, claiming that his
conviction was unconstitutional.71 The Supreme Court granted
Gideon certiorari.72
On March 18, 1963, Gideon’s persistence and faith in the
United States Constitution proved to be successful. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is a fundamental right incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment in all criminal proceedings, including
those in state court.73 In reaching its holding, the Supreme
Court expressly overturned Betts v. Brady, finding that the
Supreme Court in Betts erred in holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was not a fundamental right.74 The
63. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
67. Id. at 337.
68. Jacob, supra note 58, at 2080.
69. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
70. Id.
71. Gideon v. Wainwright - Case Providing Defendants an Attorney Turns 50, CBS Nᴇᴡs (Mar. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/gideon-v-wainwright-case-providing-defendants-an-attorneyturns-50/.
72. Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
73. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340.
74. Id. at 342.
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majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, expressed the
belief that there was extensive precedent to support the holding
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.75 Justice
Black wrote, “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”76
IV. Downfall of Gideon
A. Inadequate Defense
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s promise in Gideon has
not been properly upheld in America’s courtrooms. Today,
“[i]ndigent defense continues to be the proverbial neglected child
in the justice system.”77 Even though the unanimous Supreme
Court expressed the belief that justice required effective counsel
for both sides of the case, the burden of implementing this
constitutional guarantee was placed on the states’ shoulders.78
Many courts today fail to appoint attorneys to indigent
defendants, even though they are constitutionally required to do
so.79 On the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon’s landmark decision,
the Assistant Attorney General of Florida, Bruce Jacob, who
argued against Gideon in front of the Supreme Court, noted,
“[o]ur system hasn’t performed as well as it should in fulfilling
the promise of Gideon . . . [and] court legislatures have not gone
as far as they should in implementing the provisions of the
Gideon ruling.”80 The United States Attorney General Eric
Holder stated in recent years that the American indigent
75. Id. at 341.
76. Id. at 344.
77. Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: Providing HighQuality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713 (2013).
78. Id.
79. David Carroll, Gideon’s Despair, MARSHALL PROJECT, (Jan. 2, 2015,
7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/02/four-things-thenext-attorney-general-needs-to-know-about-america-s-indigent-defensecrisis#.YdNtzfcvB.
80. Gideon v. Wainwright- Case Providing Defendants an Attorney- Turns
50, supra note 71.
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criminal defense services “exist in a state of crisis.”81
The dismal state of indigent criminal defense creates a
ripple effect of negative consequences throughout the entire
criminal justice system.82 In the immediate sense, insufficient
criminal defense counsel can cause one of two consequences: (1)
excessive delays within the courts, causing defendants to wait in
jail for months at a time, or (2) “courts become assembly lines to
process poor people into jail or prison without adequately sorting
the guilty from the innocent.”83 According to Tanya Greene, an
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
insufficient number of public defenders is a main reason why
ninety to ninety-five percent of indigent criminal defendants
plead guilty.84
B. Inadequate Funding
The reasons for the crippling indigent defense system across
the country are numerous, including the “crippling case
overload, inadequate funding, and a pervasive, but false belief
that efficiency and effectiveness are functional equivalents.”85
Public defense offices nationwide have greater than 5,000 cases
per year, and merely twelve percent of these cases had enough
attorneys to handle the national caseload standard.86 This
national standard recommends that public defenders should not
represent more than “150 felony, 400 misdemeanor, 200
juvenile, 200 mental health, or 25 appeals per year.”87 Moreover,
approximately sixty percent of state-based public defender
offices do not implement limits on the public defenders’

81. Carroll, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble if You Can’t
Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-courtcharts.
85. Thompson, supra note 77, at 713-14.
86. Zerline Hughes & Jason Fenster, Overloaded Public Defense Systems
Result in More Prison Time, Less Justice, Jᴜsᴛ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴsᴛ. (July 27, 2011),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/2757.
87. Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.
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caseloads.88 Tanya Greene of the ACLU explained that there are
“so many cases, limited resources, and there’s no relief . . . . You
go to work, you get more cases. You have to triage.”89 According
to the Justice Department, United States public defender offices
handled more than 5.5 million cases in 2007.90
Public defender offices are “often lacking the political clout,
independence, and legislative expertise to effectively navigate
the appropriations process[.]”91
Public defenders have
frequently remained quiet in public budget negotiations.92
“Chief public defenders have chosen to fly under the radar in a
presumed effort to protect their offices from public scrutiny that
could induce governments to further reduce funding for the
‘undeserving poor’ whom defender offices represent.”93
However, the public defenders’ silence has done little to aid to
their funding deficit.94
Indigent defense offices encounter a great amount of
difficulty in obtaining funding, especially since law enforcement
and corrections agencies are considered by the public to be more
essential to the state’s criminal justice role.95 In fact, the United
States “spends less on public defense as a percentage per capita
than every single European nation.”96 Moreover, in 2012, the
federal government provided states with $287 million in grants,
giving the states the discretion to choose how to allocate these
monies to different criminal justice programs.97 However, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that law enforcement
receives more than sixty percent of Edward Byrne Memorial
88. Lee et al., supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to do a Good
Job Representing my Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken—
its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-981292d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.7fb12b180243.
91. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316,
2322 (2013).
92. Thompson, supra note 77, at 720.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Fairfax, supra, note 91, at 2322.
96. Lee et al., supra note 84.
97. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 4.
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Justice Assistance Grant (JAG), the main source of federal
justice funding for state and local jurisdictions.98 Of the small
amount that is allocated to defenders and prosecutors,
prosecutors receive seven times that of defenders.99 In fact, in
2010, less than one percent of Byrne-JAG funds, merely $1.9
million, were distributed to public defenders.100
Furthermore, even though the costs associated with
inadequate defense counsel, such as those concerning
“incarceration, probation, and parole should now be apparent,”
state legislators continuously neglect to use their political power
to ensure ample funding is provided for the state’s criminal
defense role.101 The executive director of the Justice Policy
Institute (JPI) stated that: “For every $1 we spend on public
defense, we are currently spending nearly $14 on corrections. We
need to make smarter investments that will keep us safe and not
empty our wallets.”102 Unfortunately, state legislators do not
have any political pressure motivating them to increase funding
for indigent criminal defense.103 The populations that are most
affected by these legislators’ choices are those with little political
power, the poor, and those accused of committing crimes.104
a. Reasons for Inadequate Funding
i. Fear of Those Accused of Crime
Throughout history, United States citizens have
consistently permitted individual rights to be encroached upon
in the face of fear.105 Stringent anti-crime legislation and the
media have helped create the societal view that those who
commit crimes are dangerous and do not deserve to have their

98. Id. See also Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/jag/index.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2018).
99. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Thompson, supra note 77, at 717.
102. Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.
103. Thompson, supra note 77, at 717.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 714.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11

12

KING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

672

5/10/18 3:08 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38:2

rights protected.106 Jonathan Rapping, public defense attorney
and founder of Gideon’s Promise, notes:
There is a view that public defenders represent
people who commit the most heinous crimes.
There’s a sense of, ‘Why would I fund a lawyer to
help get a rapist or a murdererout of prison?’ . . .
“Maybe they did something wrong. But it’s
something relatively minor. And now they’re
sitting in jail on a bond they can’t make, they’ve
lost their housing, their job. For these mistakes,
families are torn apart and communities are
ruined.”107
ii. Mass Incarceration
The United States has “about 5% of the world’s population
but almost 25% of its prisoners, with the world’s largest number
of inmates and highest per capita rate of incarceration.”108 As of
2017, the United States had 2.2 million individuals incarcerated
in jails or prisons.109 Almost sixty percent of incarcerated
individuals are people of color, with black men being nearly six
times more likely than white men to be incarcerated.110 In fact,
one out of ten black men in their thirties is in jail or prison every
day,111 and even more disturbing, one in every three black men
will be in prison at some point in their lifetime.112 “[T]he reality
is that today there are more African Americans under
correctional control in prison or jail, on probation or parole, than

106. Id. at 714-15.
107. Lee et al., supra note 84.
108. California’s
Overcrowded
Prisons,
The
Challenges
of
“Realignment,” ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node
/21555611.
109. Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 2,
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-USCorrections.pdf (last updated June 2017).
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.
112. Id.; See also Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 589, 592 (2016).
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were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the civil war began.”113
The so-called War on Drugs has been deemed one of the
main sources of the United States’ mass incarceration issues.
Since the War on Drugs was first implemented in the 1980s, the
number of people incarcerated for drug offenses has increased
from approximately 41,000 in 1980 to almost 500,000 in 2014.114
Moreover, the mandatory minimums imposed on drug crime
sentences keep drug offenders in prison for greater periods of
time.115 For example, in 1986, federal drug offense sentences
had an average of twenty-two months in prison; however, federal
drug offenders are now sentenced to prison for a period three
times longer, with an average of sixty-two months in prison.116
Additionally, the number of prisoners serving sentences of life
without parole rose by more than 300 percent between 1992 and
2009.117 Even more distressing is the number of incarcerated
individuals serving life sentences, at one in every nine prisoners
in 2013.118
The increase in criminalization and criminal justice
enforcement policies have contributed to the overcrowding of
jails and prisons.119 The causes and effects of mass incarceration
have created obstacles in fulfilling the Supreme Court’s promise
in Gideon.120
[T]hink of the process that leads to mass
incarceration as a swift conveyor belt, whisking
people from arrest to sentencing. First, increasing
numbers of people, mostly poor, are dumped onto
the conveyor belt. With no friction to slow it down,
the conveyor belt whisks those people to the other
113. Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander:” A System of Racial and Social
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
Control”,
FRONTLINE
/frontline/article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control/.
114. Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 3,
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-USCorrections.pdf (last updated June 2017).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Capers, supra note 112, at 591.
118. Id.
119. Fairfax, supra note 91, at 2319.
120. Id.
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end. Once there, those people are dumped into
prison cells, where they are held for increasingly
longer periods of time.121
As more and more indigent defendants are dragged into the
increasingly harsh criminal justice system, effective public
defenders have become more essential than ever.122 The
situation becomes even worse when prosecutors charge
defendants with crimes that are “far higher than warranted by
the facts of the case, and defenders often do not have time or
resources to assertively negotiate with prosecutors in plea
discussions”.123 Thus, many defendants accept unjust plea deals
instead of risking going to trial.124 In 2013, more than ninetyseven percent of criminal charges were resolved through plea
bargains, with less than three percent going to trial.125 In fact,
twenty percent of the 2.2 million incarcerated individuals in the
United States “have yet to be found guilty of a crime.”126
Accordingly, “addressing pretrial detention is significant to any
effort to address the mass-incarceration problem, and providing
poor people effective lawyers has a significant impact on these
detention rates.”127
C. Issues Concerning Indigent Defense Nationally
Although the severity of the indigent defense crisis varies
from state to state, public defenders are generally overworked
and underfunded nationwide.128 A report generated by the
Justice Policy Institute concluded that “73 percent of countybased public defender offices lacked the requisite number of
121. Jonathan A. Rapping, Retuning Gideon’s Trumpet: Telling the Story
in the Context of Today’s Criminal-Justice Crisis, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1225, 1227
(2014).
122. Id. at 1228.
123. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 2, at 1.
124. Id.
125. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocentpeople-plead-guilty/.
126. Rapping, supra note 121, at 1236.
127. Id. at 1237.
128. Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19 (2016).
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attorneys to meet caseload standards; 23 percent of these offices
had less than half of the necessary attorneys to meet caseload
standards[.]”129 The combination of the draconian sentencing
requirements and plea deals have resulted in “even relatively
well-funded public defenders hav[ing] little leverage in
advocating for their clients.”130
V. Indigent Defense in New York
In 1965, the New York State Legislature adopted New York
County Law Article 18-B.131 This law requires the individual
sixty-two counties in New York to create their own funding plan
for public defense services.132 Counties could choose between
three options: (1) creating public defender offices; (2) contracting
with a private legal aid society; or (3) creating a panel of private
assigned counsel.133 The statute did not provide any means for
oversight, or create a representation quality standard.134 In fact,
in 1967, the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA)
conducted a seminar to address the lack of standards to ensure
quality representation, and “the lack of guidelines for
determining an accused person’s eligibility for assigned counsel
and for ancillary services, such as investigators and experts, the
scope of representation, and the representation of minors.”135
The county funding system in New York State has failed to
become more effective over the years. New York’s former Chief
Judge Kaye referred to New York’s indigent defense system as
“severely dysfunctional.”136 Believing that the New York’s
system needed “[a] top-to-bottom reexamination[,]” Chief Judge
Kaye formed the Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense
129. Hughes & Fenster, supra note 86.
130. Mayeux, supra note 128, at 19-20.
131. N.Y. Cᴛʏ. Lᴀᴡ § 722-b (McKinney 2012).
132. Id.
133. N.Y. CTY. LAW § 722 (McKinney 2012).
134. A History of Public Defense in New York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/history-public-defense-new-york-state (last
visited Mar. 11, 2018) [hereinafter NYCLU].
135. Id.
136. The Editorial Board, A Big Victory for Public Defense in New York,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/opinion/abig-victory-for-public-defense-in-new-york.html.
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The Spangenberg Group contracts with the
Services.137
American Bar Association to conduct criminal justice research,
and specializes in research concerning indigent defense
services.138 The Spangenberg Group was hired by the Kaye
Commission on the Future of Indigent Services to “examine the
effectiveness of indigent criminal defense services across [New
York] State.”139 The study conducted was, and still remains, “the
most comprehensive study of indigent defense representation
ever undertaken in New York State.”140 The study required the
Spangenberg Group to travel to courtrooms in twenty-two
counties, and meet with judges and lawyers.141 The final report
indicated that New York’s indigent criminal defense system is
“broken” and “is in a serious state of crisis.”142 Further, the final
report indicated that New York’s funding system that allows the
sixty-two counties to each create their own system, has
numerous negative effects, including an absence of uniformity
and oversight, as well as an “acute and chronic lack of
funding.”143 Additionally, the final report stated that in many
instances, defendants in minor misdemeanor and violations
cases are not provided with assistance of counsel, in violation of
their rights under the state and federal constitutions.144 Finally,
the report concluded that it was the Commission’s opinion that
“New York State is currently failing to provide a substantial
number of indigent defendants with adequate and meaningful
representation as required by the state and federal constitutions

137. Geoff Burkhart, Public Defense The New York Story, 30 CRIM. JUST.,
no.
3,
2015,
at
25,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_nystory.authche
ckdam.pdf
138. Marc Sackin, Note, Applying United States v. Stein to New York’s
Indigent Defense Crisis Show the Poor Some Love Too, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 299,
301 fn. 14 (2007).
139. Id. at 301.
140. Burkhart, supra note 137, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP ET AL., STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN
NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FINAL REPORT ii (2006), https://www.nycourts.
gov/ip/indigentdefensecommission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id. at iv.
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and the laws of New York State.”145
Moreover, the final report made several recommendations
to address the ongoing issues present in New York’s insufficient
indigent defense system. The Commission first recommended
for New York to create a statewide defender office in order to
“insure accountability, enforceability of standards, and quality
representation.”146 The Commission urged New York to address
the disproportionate funding between prosecution offices and
Further, the Commission
public defense offices.147
recommended that the county funding system be “phased out,”
and to instead have the “State’s General Fund” provide sufficient
Finally, the
funding for indigent criminal defense.148
Commission recommended that New York replace its county
funding system with that of a state funded system within three
years.149
VI. New York Public Defense Reform Bill
A. Hurrell-Harring Litigation
In 2014, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)
published the report, State of Injustice: How New York State
Turns its Back on the Right to Counsel for the Poor.150 The report
evaluated the great disparity in funding between public defense
offices and district attorney offices, including that in Onondaga
County, which spent more than thirty-five times more money on
prosecutors’
investigators,
than
public
defenders’

145. Id. at vi.
146. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK iii (2006), https://www.nycourts.
gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission
_report06.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. NYCLU Report Exposes NY’s Failure to Provide Public Defense to
Poor in Violation of Constitution, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-report-exposes-nys-failureprovide-public-defense-poor-violation-constitution
[hereinafter
NYCLU
Report].
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investigators.151 The report also revealed the lack of adequate
representation by public defense offices, including that in
Onondaga County, where “public defense attorneys consulted
expert witnesses in only 22 of 14,000 cases and used
investigators in only 50 cases.”152
The information included in the NYCLU’s report was
gathered from summary judgment filings in the Hurrell-Harring
v. New York class action lawsuit brought by the NYCLU and law
firm of Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP in 2007.153 The suit
challenged the inadequacy and constitutionality of New York’s
indigent defense system, which placed the $262 million cost for
public defense on the counties’ shoulders, and only provided
counties with $62 million in support.154 The twenty plaintiffs in
the class action were criminal defendants in Onondaga, Ontario,
Schuyler, Suffolk, and Washington Counties who have
experienced the lack of quality in their criminal defense
representation.155 The lawsuit chose to focus on these five New
York counties, not because they represented the worst indigent
criminal defense in the state, but rather because they
exemplified the three different funding methods available to
counties under article 18-B, including “public defender (Schuyler
and Washington Counties), assigned counsel (Onondaga and
Ontario Counties), and contract counsel (Suffolk County).”156
With regards to the lawsuit, Executive Director of the NYCLU,
Donna Lieberman, stated, “Every day, in courtrooms throughout
the state, New Yorkers are denied justice simply because they
are poor. Justice should not depend on your ZIP code or the size

151. Id.
152. Christopher Dunn, Op-Ed, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 1, 2017,
12:30 PM), https://www.nyclu.org/en/taxonomy/term/108?page=4.
153. Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New
York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu.
org/en/press-releases/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-public-defensenew-york-state.
154. New York State Failing Its Constitutional Duty on Public Defense,
NYCLU Lawsuit Charges, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 8, 2007),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/new-york-state-failing-itsconstitutional-duty-public-defense-nyclu-lawsuit-charges [hereinafter NYCL
U Files Suit].
155. Id. See also, Burkhart, supra note 137, at 26-27.
156. Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.
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of your wallet.”157
In 2009, the New York Appellate Division dismissed the
case, finding that any relief, if justified, should come from the
legislature and not the courts, since none of the plaintiffs were
seeking relief for their convictions.158 In 2010, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the
complaint correctly stated a claim for relief for constitutional
violations of the guarantees established in Gideon.159 In 2014,
the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest, comparable to an amicus
brief.160 In their Statement of Interest, the DOJ did not reveal
its position on the merits of the case, but instead aimed to “assist
the Court in assessing whether the State of New York has
‘constructively’ denied counsel to indigent defendants during
criminal proceedings.”161 The DOJ’s Statement of Interest was
groundbreaking because it marked the first time that the DOJ
expressed support for public defense in a state court case.162
On October 21, 2014, after seven years of litigation and less
than one month after the DOJ filed their statement of interest,
the parties agreed to settle.163 The 2014 settlement agreement
required New York to reform, “focusing on the five New York
counties—Ontario, Onondaga [], Schuyler, Suffolk and
Washington[.]”164 The agreement will last seven and one-half
years, subject to court approval.165 Associate Legal Director of
the NYCLU, Christopher Dunn, stated “[t]his settlement marks
what we hope and expect to be the beginning of sweeping
reforms of New York’s broken public defense system.”166 Among
several other provisions, New York is required to hire enough
157. NYCLU Files Suit, supra note 154.
158. See Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2009).
159. See Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2010).
160. Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.
161. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Hurrell-Harring v.
New York, 866 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (No. 8866-07), www.justice.
gov/file/65011/download. See also, Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.
162. Burkhart, supra note 137, at 27.
163. Id.
164. Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New
York State, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.nyclu.
org/en/press-releases/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-public-defensenew-york-state [hereinafter NYCLU Settlement].
165. Id.
166. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/11

20

KING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

680

5/10/18 3:08 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38:2

lawyers, investigators, and support staff to guarantee that “all
poor criminal defendants have lawyers with the time and
support necessary to vigorously represent the defendant.”167
The state is also required to increase the Office of Indigent Legal
Service’s ability to conduct state-level oversight to ensure that
the constitutional requirement of quality indigent public defense
is fulfilled.168
Finally, the settlement established a new
threshold for determining whether a defendant qualifies for
public defense services.169 This new threshold is set at “250
percent of the federal poverty limit[,]” rather than permit
counties to set their own thresholds.170 William J. Leahy, head
of the Office of Indigent Legal Service, stated that this
settlement “marks the very first time that the state has stood up
and acknowledged that it is a state’s responsibility to comply
with the Gideon mandate. It is a state responsibility, not a
county responsibility.”171
B. Proposed Public Defender Reform Bill
Despite the Hurrell-Harring settlement and the KayeCommission report, the New York State Legislature has failed
to create a statewide funding system. The closest the state has
come to implementing a statewide funding system was Bill
S.8114/A.10706, which was passed unanimously by each
chamber of the state legislature in June of 2016.172 This public
defender reform bill was sponsored by Senator John
DeFrancisco and Assembly Member Patricia Fahy,173 and had
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Jimmy Vielkind, Groups Urge Cuomo to Sign Indigent Defense Bill
Amid Worries Over Cost, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:26 AM), http://www.
politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/groups-urge-cuomo-to-signindigent-defense-bill-amid-cost-worries-108067.
170. Id.
171. Burkhart, supra note 137, at 28 (quoting Indigent Legal Services:A
Discussion with William Leahy, AMICI (2015), www.nycourts.gov/admin/
amici/).
172. S. 8114, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). See also John Stashenko,
Long-Sought Indigent Defense Bill Goes to Governor’s Desk, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 21,
2016, 6:02 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/12027753385
58/.
173. Id.
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support from numerous groups, including veteran organizations,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), and county government leaders.174 In an effort to
meet the constitutional mandate under Gideon, the bill would
place the responsibility of funding public defense on New York
State, and would be completely implemented by 2023.175 Under
the public defender reform bill, the Office of Indigent Legal
Services would be authorized to establish and uphold standards
of effective legal representation for indigent defendants.176 The
bill would extend the public defense reform that has been
initiated for the five counties in the Hurrell-Harring settlement
agreement to all of the counties in New York.
Unfortunately, Governor Cuomo vetoed the bi-partisan bill
at the last minute on New Year’s Eve 2016.177 In his veto
message, Governor Cuomo stated, “This bill would do little more
than transfer to the taxpayers of this state an entirely new
obligation to pay for any and all existing expenses related to
general defense legal work, far beyond legal representation of
indigent criminal defendants.”178 Governor Cuomo believed that
the legislators included over $800 million in legal aid costs that
were not related to criminal defense, and instead involved family
court and other courtrooms.179 Governor Cuomo asserted that
this bill was not truly an indigent defense bill, but instead was
merely an “attempt to shift costs from the counties to the state
taxpayers under the guise of indigent defense.”180 However,
Governor Cuomo pledged to introduce his own proposal on how
174. Vielkind, supra note 169.
175. News Release Assembly Speaker Carl E. Heastie State Legislature
Passes Measure to Address Disparities in New York’s Justice System, N.Y. ST.
ASSEMBLY (June 17, 2016), http://nyassembly.gov/Press/20160617a/.
176. Id.
177. The Editorial Board, New York’s Unequal Justice for the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/new-yorksunequal-justice-for-the-poor.html.
178. Jimmy Vielkind, Citing Cost, Cuomo Vetoes Indigent Legal Defense
Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 31, 2016, 11:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/newyork/albany/story/2016/12/citing-cost-cuomo-vetoes-indigent-legal-defensebill-108386.
179. Id.
180. Matthew Hamilton, Gov. Cuomo Vetoes Legal Services Bill, TIMES
UNION (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Gov-Cuomovetoes-legal-services-bill-10829111.php.
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to handle New York’s indigent defense system and the HurrellHarring settlement.181
Not surprisingly, the proponents of the public defender
reform bill were disappointed in Governor Cuomo’s decision.
Many of the proponents could not understand why Governor
Cuomo would agree to the Hurrell-Harring settlement for only
five counties and refuse to extend the agreement to the
remaining fifty-eight counties with this bill. The Senate Deputy
Majority Leader, John DeFransisco, a Republican, asserted that
Governor Cuomo should not have been surprised by the cost,
especially since “[t]his bill passe[d] six months ago . . . It made
no sense in the [Hurrell-Harring] settlement to make more
people eligible . . . and then say it’s too costly.”182 Senator
DeFransisco further argued “What about the other counties –
are they chump change or do they have to go ahead and bring a
lawsuit and settle with the governor for the same amount?”183
Donna Lieberman, the NYCLU Executive Director, noted, “We
are deeply disappointed that the governor has vetoed the most
important criminal justice reform legislation in memory.”184
Additionally, the New York State Bar Association expressed
their disappointment in Governor Cuomo’s veto of the public
defense reform bill.185 The New York State Bar Association
further criticized Governor Cuomo’s proposal to fund the 2017
increase in county expenditures for public defense services, by
increasing the Biennial Attorney Registration Fee by fifty
dollars, rather than using the state’s General Fund to satisfy the

181. Vielkind, supra note 8.
182. Jimmy Vielkind, Legal Defense Bill Remains in Limbo After Failed
Special
Session Plan,
POLITICO (Dec.
20, 2016,
5:14 AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/afterconsideration-in-special-talks-legal-defense-bill-still-in-limbo-108371.
183. Jimmy Vielkind, Group Urges Cuomo to Sign Indigent Defense Bill
Amid Worries Over Cost, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:26 AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/groups-urgecuomo-to-sign-indigent-defense-bill-amid-cost-worries-108067.
184. Kenneth Lovett, Cuomo Vetoes Bill Requiring N.Y. to Fund Legal
Services for Poor, N.Y. Dᴀɪ ʟ ʏ Nᴇᴡs (Jan. 1, 2017, 12:42 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/cuomo-vetoes-bill-requiring-n-yfund-legal-services-poor-article-1.2930833.
185. Claire P. Gutekunst, The Imperative to Protect Human Rights and
the Rule of Law, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Feb. 2017 at 5.
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constitutional mandate under Gideon.186 Overall, Governor
Cuomo’s 2017 budget provisions regarding New York’s criminal
justice system were not well received by many.
C. What Should the New Reform Legislation Look Like?
As previously stated, although Governor Cuomo vetoed the
public defender reform bill, he pledged to pass a new bill that
would ensure the constitutional mandates of Gideon are upheld.
There is an abundant amount of research to guide New York
State’s lawmakers to enact a statute that would ensure every
criminal defendant receives a quality legal representation,
regardless of their ability to pay. Scholars have provided various
methods that could be implemented to address the problems
plaguing public defender offices.
Three different reform
proposals include, “(1) public defender programs that employ
full- or part-time counsel; (2) a contract system, where
individuals or firms engage in a contract to provide
representation for a number of indigent defendants; and (3) an
assigned counsel system, where courts appoint attorneys to
handle individual cases.”187
Not only is there a large amount of scholarship on the
subject, but New York can learn from reform efforts in other
states as well. Recent phenomena and public discourse have led
to many reform efforts throughout the nation. The increased
attention to mass incarceration has acted as a catalyst for
indigent defense reform efforts.188 In 2013, the Office for Access
to Justice, which works with federal, state, and local officials to
permit indigent citizens greater access to effective counsel,
“issued $6.7 million in federal grants designed to improve
indigent criminal defense services.”189 Additionally, Utah
passed a bill in March of 2016, which created a commission to
oversee indigent defense, and will include state funding for the
first time, leaving Pennsylvania as the only state not providing
186. Id.
187. Margaret A. Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon:
Litigation as a Viable Strategic Tool, 99 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ. 1951, 1958 (2000).
188. Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent
Defense, 100 Mɪɴɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1769, 1804 (2016).
189. Id. at 1802-03.
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any funding for indigent defense.190
Even though the majority of states currently fund at least
ninety percent or more of their public defense system,191 the
manner in which each state provides this funding varies
greatly.192 “There is a disturbing lack of consistency in the
amounts allocated to indigent defense and the services or cases
to which that funding is linked.”193 In the ABA’s 1992 Standards
for Criminal Justice, the ABA noted that “it [is] preferable to
create a statewide system of defense,” emphasizing that state
programs “have shown their ability to grow and change with the
times while maintaining financial stability.”194 Efforts to reform
funding for indigent defense systems should make sure that
there is “meaningful oversight of defense counsel.”195 This
“meaningful oversight” must concentrate on whether defense
counsel represents the defendants zealously and through a
client-centered approach.196
It seems as though Governor Cuomo may have taken this
scholarship into consideration when he proposed his own plan to
address New York’s indigent defense system through the 20172018 budget, signed on April 8, 2017.197 The budget includes a
six-year plan to improve indigent public defense; however, it
does not encompass the entire $450 million cost necessary to
provide effective counsel as required by Gideon.198 Rather, the
budget calls for the state to compensate counties for the cost of
190. David Carroll, Utah Reforms Indigent Defense with First-Ever State
Dollars for Trial Representation, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://sixthamendment.org/utah-reforms-indigent-defense-with-first-everstate-dollars-for-trial-representation/. .
191. Thompson, supra note 77, at 723.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 723-24.
194. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES 3, 9-10 (3rd ed. 1992) https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/providing_defense_
services.authcheckdam.pdf.
195. Primus, supra note 188, at 1815.
196. Id.
197. News Release Assembly Speaker Carl E. Heastie SFY 2017-2018
Budget Includes Six Year Plan to Improve Public Defense Services Statewide,
N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY (April 8, 2017), http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/201704
08a/.
198. Joel Stashenko, Budget Contains Long-Sought Relief for Some
Indigent Criminal Defense Costs, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 10, 2017.

25

KING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/10/18 3:08 PM

NEW YORK BREAKS GIDEON’S PROMISE

685

implementing the improvements established in the HurrellHarring settlement.199 These improvements include requiring
the state’s Office of Indigent Legal Services to create and
implement standards for public defense concerning “presence of
counsel at a criminal defendant’s first court appearance;
reasonable limits on the caseloads public defense attorneys can
carry; proper training, supervision, and support staff for
attorneys; and access to resources needed to mount an effective
defense.”200 By the year 2023, the state is expected to provide
counties with $250 million each year for indigent defense.201
While many of these trends in legislation and policy seem to
be heading in the direction of an improved indigent criminal
defense system, not only in New York, but across the United
States, there are still many obstacles in the way. To be sure,
there are still many who are doubtful that real change will
result.202 William Leahy, director of the NYS Office of Indigent
Legal Services believes “This [six year plan] is less than whole,
but it is what I have been saying since the day after the HurrellHarring settlement was signed, that the state has to make sure
that all counties are in compliance with the [C]onstitution.”203
Further, the executive director of New York State Defenders
Association, Jonathan Gradess, expressed, “I don’t think it’s
going to be enough, but it moves us in the direction of maturely
looking at the system.”204 Those who have doubts about the
effectiveness of this budget plan have reason to be skeptical. Not
only does this budget plan fail to cover the entire $450 million
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202. John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122
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a much higher bar for the quality of representation required under the Sixth
Amendment, the right to effective assistance of counsel will continue to elude
indigent defendants).
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Funding for Indigent Defense, ABA J. (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:45 PM),
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cost of indigent defense, but some of the states who previously
passed public defense reform legislation have still failed to
adequately fund their systems. For example, Mississippi
enacted reform legislation in 1998, “only to repeal [it] a few years
later when funding had still not materialized.”205 Other states
have cut funding for indigent defense after passing legislation
meant to help increase funding. In Montana, the state’s
allocation for indigent criminal defense in the budget has fallen
more than $3 million dollars behind the state’s original funding
goal.206 While efforts have been made to address the crisis, it is
far from being completely remedied.
VII. Conclusion
It has been over fifty years since the Supreme Court held in
Gideon that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
counsel, regardless of their socioeconomic status. Yet, New York
State has largely failed to satisfy this constitutional
requirement. The state’s failure not only delegitimizes its legal
system, but has profound detrimental effects on indigent
criminal defendants and their loved ones. As Corey Stoughton,
NYCLU Senior Staff and lead counsel on the HurrellHarring case, stated, “Our criminal justice system only works at
producing the truth if both the prosecution and the defense are
on equal footing. In much of New York State, the system is
broken.”207 Until New York State replaces their county funded
indigent criminal defense system with a state funded system
and provides meaningful oversight, indigent criminal
defendants will continue to have their constitutional rights
violated. Governor Cuomo had the chance to ensure significant
change occurred. However, he floundered this opportunity. One
can only hope that New York’s legislators will hold him to his
word and ensure that Gideon’s promise is fulfilled.
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